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
7 December 1951

CAREER SERVICE COMMITTEE

Working Group on CAREER BENEFITS

Minutes of the 7th Meeting, 6 December 1951, 3:30 P.M.

Present:




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1. The minutes of the 6th meeting were read and approved, subject to correction of the last paragraph, Item 5, as follows:

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After much discussion, it was agreed that
will study

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2. The Chairman reported that the Working Group's recommendations on hazardous pay, forwarded to the Career Service Committee on 19 November 1951, have been reviewed by the Senior Review Committee and referred to the Director of Training for further review in order to insure that all phases of hazardous duty associated with Training activities are included in the study and recommendations. This action in referring this matter to the Director of Training, rather than to the Working Group on Career Benefits, is based upon the concept that these factors of hazardous pay are occasioned by an immediate operational need within the Training Office, rather than by factors in a longer-term Career Benefits Program.

3. The Executive Secretary reported action on the memorandum of the Working Group on Career Benefits to the Career Service Committee on the subject "Continuance of Pay and Allowance," dated 29 November 1951. The Career Service Committee requests that the Working Group on Career Benefits restudy Bill E. 1820 with a view to providing specific recommendations on revisions of the Bill as now proposed, which would more

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clearly reflect and provide for the solution of Agency problems in handling affairs of employees who are lost in performance of official duties. The Chairman of the Working Group agreed to report on specific objections to this Bill that have been raised by the General Accounting Officer and particularly Section 4, lines 8 and 9, which refer to the limitation of "missing status" to not more than 90 days. The matter was tabled, pending receipt of the Chairman's report.

4. The Chairman distributed copies to each member of the Working Group of Title 37 of the United States Code Annotated, covering pay and allowances, specifically Section 235, Incentive pay for hazardous duty--

25X1C10b [REDACTED] Working Group concurred that, while further discussion of hazardous duty as generally defined in connection with intelligence activities could more properly be discussed when the study noted under paragraph 1 of these minutes is completed, it would be logical to continue discussions of extra-hazardous-duty categories specifically to provide through such study a definition of categories of extra-hazardous duty.

5. The balance of the meeting was opened to discussion of Item II of the Agenda of the Working Group, which produced the following salient points:

A. There was general agreement that any Career Benefits Program must be of such a nature as to be applicable to all activities throughout the Central Intelligence Agency. The natural sequence of this position is: Can such a concept be maintained?

B. Any career benefits program applicable Agency-wide must provide means for the resolution of essential differences between para-military and civilian-type assignments. This question calls for resolution of problems originating out of the National Security Council requirements and assignments placed upon the Agency, which are primarily para-military in nature as opposed to those more conventional, long-term intelligence assignments growing out of the Agency's charter.

C. In a para-military-type assignment, success of the venture is proportional to the measure of control over individuals assigned to the mission. This brings to attention the question of whether or not the Articles of War concept for control and its attendant system of penalties make it in the interest of the individual to comply; that is, benefits which can be removed from the individual over and above those obligations to him, established by law.

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It was pointed out that the factor of compulsion was not necessarily the best means of motivating and attracting individuals of the type needed for intelligence operations. To the contrary, it was pointed out that any suprabenefits essential in attracting and assuring acceptance of specific assignments in intelligence operations may be better handled under contract arrangements, which assures that such benefits will be given, provided the contract is completed.

D. Under "commission systems," the individual rather than the position is evaluated. The basic question then arises: Can any system, based upon the evaluation of the individual, actually avoid evaluation of the position? Also, is there a fundamental difference between a classified system which admittedly evaluates the position as opposed to the "commission system" which evaluates the individual, but provides for evaluation of positions to which such individuals may be assigned? Motivation of the individual will always be somewhat dependent upon position evaluation--ie., does the position pose problems which are challenging to the individual? These facts are recognized in present military commission systems that provide for the evaluation of all assignments. A principle factor in favor of classified systems is that it provides for competition among individuals for assignments in such a system, presumably resulting in higher-quality work and continued aggressive attention to successful completion of assignments. Selective processes under commission systems do not necessarily provide opportunities for service by those individuals who are best qualified for such assignments.

6. The meeting was adjourned at 1700, to meet again on Thursday, 13 December 1951, in [REDACTED]

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